Arbeitspapier
Disguising Lies - Image Concerns and Partial Lying in Cheating Games
We study equilibrium reporting behavior in Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013) type cheating games when agents have a fixed cost of lying and image concerns not to be perceived as a liar. We show that equilibria naturally arise in which agents with low costs of lying randomize among a set of the highest potential reports. Such equilibria induce a distribution of reports in line with observed experimental patterns. We also find that higher image concerns lead to an increase in the range of reported lies while the effect of the fixed cost of lying is the opposite.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 6347
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
Noncooperative Games
- Thema
-
cost of lying
image concerns
cheating game
truth-telling
deception
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Khalmetski, Kiryl
Sliwka, Dirk
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2017
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Khalmetski, Kiryl
- Sliwka, Dirk
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2017
Ähnliche Objekte (12)
Career Concerns in a Simple Experimental Labour Market
Economics of Ethical and Prosocial Behavior: Experiments on Social Responsibility, Ignorance, and Cheating
On the Notion of Responsibility in Organizations
On the Hidden Costs of Incentive Schemes
Trust as a signal of a social norm and the hidden costs of incentive schemes
On the Hidden Costs of Incentive Schemes
Bonuses and performance evaluations
On the Use of Nonfinancial Performance Measures in Management Compensation
Management Incentives, Signaling Effects and the Costs of Vertical Integration
Envy and Compassion in Tournaments
Can Contracts Signal Social Norms? Experimental Evidence
Should You Allow Your Agent to Become Your Competitor? On Non-Compete Agreements in Employment Contracts
Career Concerns in a Simple Experimental Labour Market
Economics of Ethical and Prosocial Behavior: Experiments on Social Responsibility, Ignorance, and Cheating
On the Notion of Responsibility in Organizations
On the Hidden Costs of Incentive Schemes
Trust as a signal of a social norm and the hidden costs of incentive schemes
On the Hidden Costs of Incentive Schemes
Bonuses and performance evaluations
On the Use of Nonfinancial Performance Measures in Management Compensation
Management Incentives, Signaling Effects and the Costs of Vertical Integration
Envy and Compassion in Tournaments
Can Contracts Signal Social Norms? Experimental Evidence
Should You Allow Your Agent to Become Your Competitor? On Non-Compete Agreements in Employment Contracts
Career Concerns in a Simple Experimental Labour Market
Economics of Ethical and Prosocial Behavior: Experiments on Social Responsibility, Ignorance, and Cheating
On the Notion of Responsibility in Organizations
On the Hidden Costs of Incentive Schemes
Trust as a signal of a social norm and the hidden costs of incentive schemes
On the Hidden Costs of Incentive Schemes
Bonuses and performance evaluations
On the Use of Nonfinancial Performance Measures in Management Compensation
Management Incentives, Signaling Effects and the Costs of Vertical Integration
Envy and Compassion in Tournaments
Can Contracts Signal Social Norms? Experimental Evidence