Arbeitspapier

Disguising Lies - Image Concerns and Partial Lying in Cheating Games

We study equilibrium reporting behavior in Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013) type cheating games when agents have a fixed cost of lying and image concerns not to be perceived as a liar. We show that equilibria naturally arise in which agents with low costs of lying randomize among a set of the highest potential reports. Such equilibria induce a distribution of reports in line with observed experimental patterns. We also find that higher image concerns lead to an increase in the range of reported lies while the effect of the fixed cost of lying is the opposite.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 6347

Classification
Wirtschaft
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
Noncooperative Games
Subject
cost of lying
image concerns
cheating game
truth-telling
deception

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Khalmetski, Kiryl
Sliwka, Dirk
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(where)
Munich
(when)
2017

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Khalmetski, Kiryl
  • Sliwka, Dirk
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Time of origin

  • 2017

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