Arbeitspapier
Stable commitment in an intertemporal collusive trade
This study presents a more general collusive mechanism that is sustainable in an oligopolistic repeated game. In this setup, firms can obtain average payoffs beyond the cooperative profits while at the same time improve consumer welfare through a lower market price offer. In particular, we introduce here the notion of intertemporal collusive trade where each oligopolist, apart from regularly producing the normal cooperative output, is also allowed in a systematic way to earn higher than the rest at some stages of the game. This admits subgame-perfection and is shown under some conditions to be Pareto-superior to the typical cooperative outcome.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: UPSE Discussion Paper ; No. 2013-01
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Thema
-
Preiswettbewerb
Internationaler Wettbewerb
Pareto-Optimum
Oligopol
Wiederholte Spiele
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Balanquit, Romeo
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
University of the Philippines, School of Economics (UPSE)
- (wo)
-
Quezon City
- (wann)
-
2013
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Balanquit, Romeo
- University of the Philippines, School of Economics (UPSE)
Entstanden
- 2013
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