Arbeitspapier

Stable commitment in an intertemporal collusive trade

This study presents a more general collusive mechanism that is sustainable in an oligopolistic repeated game. In this setup, firms can obtain average payoffs beyond the cooperative profits while at the same time improve consumer welfare through a lower market price offer. In particular, we introduce here the notion of intertemporal collusive trade where each oligopolist, apart from regularly producing the normal cooperative output, is also allowed in a systematic way to earn higher than the rest at some stages of the game. This admits subgame-perfection and is shown under some conditions to be Pareto-superior to the typical cooperative outcome.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: UPSE Discussion Paper ; No. 2013-01

Classification
Wirtschaft
Subject
Preiswettbewerb
Internationaler Wettbewerb
Pareto-Optimum
Oligopol
Wiederholte Spiele
Theorie

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Balanquit, Romeo
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
University of the Philippines, School of Economics (UPSE)
(where)
Quezon City
(when)
2013

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Balanquit, Romeo
  • University of the Philippines, School of Economics (UPSE)

Time of origin

  • 2013

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