Identification in discrete choice models with imperfect information

Arbeitspapier

We study identification of preferences in static single-agent discrete choice models where decision makers may be imperfectly informed about the state of the world. We leverage the notion of one-player Bayes Correlated Equilibrium by Bergemann and Morris (2016) to provide a tractable characterization of the sharp identified set. We develop a procedure to practically construct the sharp identified set when the state of the world is continuous following a sieve approach, and provide sharp bounds on counterfactual outcomes of interest. We use our methodology and data on the 2017 UK general election to estimate a spatial voting model under weak assumptions on agents' information about the returns to voting. Counterfactual exercises quantify the consequences of imperfect information on the well-being of voters and parties.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Working Paper ; No. 949

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Econometrics ; Single Equation Models; Single Variables: Discrete Regression and Qualitative Choice Models; Discrete Regressors; Proportions; Probabilities ; Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior ; Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty: General
• Thema: Discrete choice model ; Bayesian Persuasion ; Bayes Correlated Equilibrium ; Incomplete Information ; Partial Identification ; Moment Inequalities ; Spatial Model of Voting

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Gualdani, Cristina ; Sinha, Shruti
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance
• (wo): London
• (wann): 2023

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/284299
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ