The effects of disclosure regulation on innovative firms: private values

Arbeitspapier

Firms in an R&D race actively manage rivals’ beliefs by disclosing and concealing information on their cost of investment. The firms’ disclosure strategies affect their incentives to invest in R&D, and to acquire information. We compare equilibria under voluntary disclosure with those under mandatory disclosure in a model where the firms’ cost of investment are identically independently distributed. Under voluntary disclosure firms conceal bad news, and disclose good news only if little knowledge spills over to their rival. Under mandatory disclosure firms expect higher profits for given information acquisition investments, but they may acquire less information.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: WZB Discussion Paper ; No. FS IV 02-05

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design ; Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness ; Organization of Production ; Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives ; Management of Technological Innovation and R&D
• Subject: R&D competition ; disclosure regulation ; knowledge spillovers

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Jansen, Jos
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)
• (where): Berlin
• (when): 2002

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/51052
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET