Arbeitspapier
The effects of disclosure regulation on innovative firms: private values
Firms in an R&D race actively manage rivals’ beliefs by disclosing and concealing information on their cost of investment. The firms’ disclosure strategies affect their incentives to invest in R&D, and to acquire information. We compare equilibria under voluntary disclosure with those under mandatory disclosure in a model where the firms’ cost of investment are identically independently distributed. Under voluntary disclosure firms conceal bad news, and disclose good news only if little knowledge spills over to their rival. Under mandatory disclosure firms expect higher profits for given information acquisition investments, but they may acquire less information.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: WZB Discussion Paper ; No. FS IV 02-05
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
Organization of Production
Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
Management of Technological Innovation and R&D
- Thema
-
R&D competition
disclosure regulation
knowledge spillovers
- Ereignis
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Jansen, Jos
- Ereignis
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Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)
- (wo)
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Berlin
- (wann)
-
2002
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Jansen, Jos
- Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)
Entstanden
- 2002