Arbeitspapier

The effects of disclosure regulation on innovative firms: private values

Firms in an R&D race actively manage rivals’ beliefs by disclosing and concealing information on their cost of investment. The firms’ disclosure strategies affect their incentives to invest in R&D, and to acquire information. We compare equilibria under voluntary disclosure with those under mandatory disclosure in a model where the firms’ cost of investment are identically independently distributed. Under voluntary disclosure firms conceal bad news, and disclose good news only if little knowledge spills over to their rival. Under mandatory disclosure firms expect higher profits for given information acquisition investments, but they may acquire less information.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: WZB Discussion Paper ; No. FS IV 02-05

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
Organization of Production
Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
Management of Technological Innovation and R&D
Thema
R&D competition
disclosure regulation
knowledge spillovers

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Jansen, Jos
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)
(wo)
Berlin
(wann)
2002

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Jansen, Jos
  • Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)

Entstanden

  • 2002

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