Arbeitspapier
Firms’ rationales for CEO duality: Evidence from a mandatory disclosure regulation
Exploiting the 2009 amendments to Regulation S-K, we provide unique evidence on the first-time disclosure of the reasons firms state for combining (separating) the roles of CEO and chairman. The stated reasons support both agency theory and organization theory. They are more numerous and comprise more words, including more positive words, for firms with duality. Examining the announcement returns to firms' disclosures, we find that investors evaluate the most frequently cited reasons for CEO duality by considering the firm's characteristics.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: CFR Working Paper ; No. 18-06
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance
Corporate Finance and Governance: Government Policy and Regulation
- Thema
-
CEO Duality
Board of Directors
Corporate Governance
Regulation S-K
Textual Analysis
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Goergen, Marc
Limbach, Peter
Scholz-Daneshgari, Meik
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
University of Cologne, Centre for Financial Research (CFR)
- (wo)
-
Cologne
- (wann)
-
2019
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:46 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Goergen, Marc
- Limbach, Peter
- Scholz-Daneshgari, Meik
- University of Cologne, Centre for Financial Research (CFR)
Entstanden
- 2019
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