Arbeitspapier

Stochastic stability in the best shot game

The best shot game applied to networks is a discrete model of many processes of contribution to local public goods. It has generally a wide multiplicity of equilibria that we refine through stochastic stability. In this paper we show that, depending on how we define perturbations, i.e. the possible mistakes that agents can make, we can obtain very different sets of stochastically stable equilibria. In particular and non-trivially, if we assume that the only possible source of error is that of an agent contributing that stops doing so, then the only stochastically stable equilibria are those in which the maximal number of players contributes.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 2010,124

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
Network Formation and Analysis: Theory
Public Goods
Thema
Networks
Best Shot Game
Stochastic Stability

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Boncinelli, Leonardo
Pin, Paolo
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
(wo)
Milano
(wann)
2010

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Boncinelli, Leonardo
  • Pin, Paolo
  • Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)

Entstanden

  • 2010

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