Stochastic stability in the best shot game

Arbeitspapier

The best shot game applied to networks is a discrete model of many processes of contribution to local public goods. It has generally a wide multiplicity of equilibria that we refine through stochastic stability. In this paper we show that, depending on how we define perturbations, i.e. the possible mistakes that agents can make, we can obtain very different sets of stochastically stable equilibria. In particular and non-trivially, if we assume that the only possible source of error is that of an agent contributing that stops doing so, then the only stochastically stable equilibria are those in which the maximal number of players contributes.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 2010,124

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Noncooperative Games ; Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games ; Network Formation and Analysis: Theory ; Public Goods
• Subject: Networks ; Best Shot Game ; Stochastic Stability

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Boncinelli, Leonardo ; Pin, Paolo
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
• (where): Milano
• (when): 2010

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/43532
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET