An approach to bounded rationality

Arbeitspapier

A central question in game theory and artificial intelligence is how a rational agent should behave in a complex environment, given that it cannot perform unbounded computations. We study strategic aspects of this question by formulating a simple model of a game with additional costs (computational or otherwise) for each strategy. First we connect this to zero-sum games, proving a counter-intuitive generalization of the classic min-max theorem to zero-sum games with the addition of strategy costs. We then show that potential games with strategy costs remain potential games. Both zero-sum and potential games with strategy costs maintain a very appealing property: simple learning dynamics converge to equilibrium.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Discussion Paper ; No. 1439

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft
• Subject: Beschränkte Rationalität ; Spieltheorie ; Entscheidungstheorie ; Theorie

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Ben-Sasson, Eli ; Tauman Kalai, Adam ; Kalai, Ehud
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
• (where): Evanston, IL
• (when): 2006

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/31222
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET