Arbeitspapier

Optimal monetary policy under bounded rationality

Optimal monetary policy under discretion, commitment, and optimal simple rules regimes is analyzed through a behavioral New Keynesian model. Flexible price level targeting dominates under discretion; flexible inflation targeting dominates under commitment; and strict price level targeting dominates when using optimal simple rules. The optimality of a particular regime is found to be independent of bounded rationality and only regime 's stabilizing properties condition its hierarchy. For every targeting regime, the policymaker 's knowledge of agents' myopia is decisive in terms of policy reactions. Welfare evaluation of different targeting regimes reveals that bounded rationality is not necessarily associated with decreased welfare. Several forms of economic inattention can increase welfare.

ISBN
978-952-323-222-8
Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers ; No. 9/2018

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Forecasting Models; Simulation Methods
Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles: Forecasting and Simulation: Models and Applications
Monetary Policy
Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
Consumer Economics: Theory

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Benchimol, Jonathan
Bounader, Lahcen
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Bank of Finland
(wo)
Helsinki
(wann)
2018

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Benchimol, Jonathan
  • Bounader, Lahcen
  • Bank of Finland

Entstanden

  • 2018

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