Arbeitspapier
Why are trade agreements more attractive in the presence of foreign direct investment?
This paper argues that interests of nationals and owners of home-based foreign capital in the formation of a Trade Agreements (TA) are not antagonistic, except under rather particular assumptions on initial tariffs among potential members. Further, if initial tariffs are endogenously determined through an industry-lobbying process, then TA that would have been immiserising in the absence of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), may be welfare-enhancing in the presence of foreign-owned firms. The rationale is linked to the effect that the entry of FDI has on the pre-TA tariff, through contributions to the incumbent government. These results may help explain recent integration programs between developed and developing countries.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: WTO Staff Working Paper ; No. ERAD-98-03
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies; Fragmentation
Economic Integration
Multinational Firms; International Business
- Thema
-
Trade Agreement
Foreign Direct
Political Economy
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Olarreaga, Marcelo
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
World Trade Organization (WTO)
- (wo)
-
Geneva
- (wann)
-
1998
- DOI
-
doi:10.30875/ede7ca61-en
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Olarreaga, Marcelo
- World Trade Organization (WTO)
Entstanden
- 1998