Arbeitspapier

Why are trade agreements more attractive in the presence of foreign direct investment?

This paper argues that interests of nationals and owners of home-based foreign capital in the formation of a Trade Agreements (TA) are not antagonistic, except under rather particular assumptions on initial tariffs among potential members. Further, if initial tariffs are endogenously determined through an industry-lobbying process, then TA that would have been immiserising in the absence of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), may be welfare-enhancing in the presence of foreign-owned firms. The rationale is linked to the effect that the entry of FDI has on the pre-TA tariff, through contributions to the incumbent government. These results may help explain recent integration programs between developed and developing countries.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: WTO Staff Working Paper ; No. ERAD-98-03

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies; Fragmentation
Economic Integration
Multinational Firms; International Business
Thema
Trade Agreement
Foreign Direct
Political Economy

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Olarreaga, Marcelo
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
World Trade Organization (WTO)
(wo)
Geneva
(wann)
1998

DOI
doi:10.30875/ede7ca61-en
Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Olarreaga, Marcelo
  • World Trade Organization (WTO)

Entstanden

  • 1998

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