Arbeitspapier
International environmental agreements in the presence of adaptation
We show that adaptive measures undertaken by countries in the face of climate change, apart from directly reducing the damage caused by climate change, may also indirectly mitigate greenhouse gas emissions by increasing the stable size of international agreements on emission reductions. Moreover, we show that the more effective the adaptive measure in terms of reducing the marginal damage from emissions, the larger the stable size of the international environmental agreement. In addition, we show that larger coalitions, in the presence of adaptation, may lead to lower global emission levels and higher welfare.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 35.2011
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Climate; Natural Disasters and Their Management; Global Warming
Environmental Economics: Other
- Subject
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International Environmental Agreements
Adaptation
Coalition Formation
Climate Change
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Marrouch, Walid
Chaudhuri, Amrita Ray
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
- (where)
-
Milano
- (when)
-
2011
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Marrouch, Walid
- Chaudhuri, Amrita Ray
- Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
Time of origin
- 2011
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Environmental regulation through voluntary agreements
Asymmetric Innovation Agreements under Environmental Regulation
Transnational environmental agreements with heterogeneous actors
The structure of international environmental agreements
Some reflections on multilateral environmental agreements
Adaptation, internalization and environmental damage
A bargaining model of voluntary environmental agreements
International environmental agreements: Incentives and political economy