Arbeitspapier

The structure of international environmental agreements

Since the framework convention of Rio, actual environmental negotiations on climate change aim at inducing all world countries to sign global environmental agreements to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Despite the past unsuccessful attempts, even current negotiations seem to pursue the same objective. This paper shows from a game-theoretic viewpoint that the emergence of agreements signed by all countries is quite unlikely, even in the presence of appropriate and multi-issues negotiation strategies and transfers. Either a single partial agreement or a coalition structure in which regional environmental agreements to control climate change are signed are the most likely outcomes. The paper compares these two cases and argues that regional agreements may increase both countries welfare and environmental quality.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 12.1998

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Public Goods
Energy: General
Energy: Government Policy
Thema
Non-cooperative game theory
Endogenous formation of coalitions
Environmental agreements
Climate change
Umweltabkommen
Spieltheorie
Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Carraro, Carlo
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
(wo)
Milano
(wann)
1998

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
20.09.2024, 08:25 MESZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Carraro, Carlo
  • Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)

Entstanden

  • 1998

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