Arbeitspapier

Fiscal Policy, Sovereign Default, and Bailouts

This paper examines fiscal policy without commitment and the effects of conditional bailout loans. The government relies on distortionary taxation and decides between full debt repayment and costly default. It tends to overborrow due to myopia, which induces default to be a relevant policy option and provides a rationale to constrain sovereign borrowing. We consider a lump-sum financed fund that offers loans at a favorable price and conditional upon minimum primary surpluses. While the government prefers defaulting in the most adverse states, we find that it is willing to accept conditional loans in close-to-default states. These bailouts can lead to an increase in the mean debt price and a lower default probability that are associated with enhanced household welfare. Yet, these outcomes can be reversed when bailouts are too generous, while public debt never decreases in the long-run when bailout loans are available.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 7805

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Business Fluctuations; Cycles
Taxation and Subsidies: Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
National Debt; Debt Management; Sovereign Debt
Thema
discretionary fiscal policy
overborrowing
sovereign default
bailout loans
conditionality

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Juessen, Falko
Schabert, Andreas
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
(wo)
Bonn
(wann)
2013

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Juessen, Falko
  • Schabert, Andreas
  • Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Entstanden

  • 2013

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