Arbeitspapier

Welfare gains of bailouts in a sovereign default model

We examine the welfare effects of bailouts in economies exposed to sovereign default risk. When a government of a small open economy requests a bailout from an international financial institution, it receives a non-defaultable loan of size G that comes with imposed debt limits. The government endogenously asks for the bailout during recessions and repays it when the economy recovers. Hence, the bailout acts as an imperfect state contingent asset that makes the economy better off. The bailout duration is endogenous and increases with its size. The bailout size creates non-trivial tradeoffs between receiving a larger amount of relatively cheap resources precisely in times of need on the one hand, and facing longer-lasting financial constraints and accumulated interest payments, on the other hand. We characterize and quantify these tradeoffs and document that welfare gains of bailouts are hump-shaped in the size of bailout loans.

ISBN
978-952-323-307-2
Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers ; No. 25/2019

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
Current Account Adjustment; Short-term Capital Movements
International Lending and Debt Problems

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Pancrazi, Roberto
Seoane, Hernán D.
Vukotic, Marija
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Bank of Finland
(wo)
Helsinki
(wann)
2019

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Pancrazi, Roberto
  • Seoane, Hernán D.
  • Vukotic, Marija
  • Bank of Finland

Entstanden

  • 2019

Ähnliche Objekte (12)