Iterative versus standard deferred acceptance: experimental evidence
Abstract: We run laboratory experiments where subjects are matched to colleges, and colleges are not strategic agents. We test the Gale-Shapley Deferred Acceptance (DA) mechanism versus the Iterative Deferred Acceptance Mechanism (IDAM), a matching mechanism based on a new family of procedures being used in the field, in which information about tentative allocations is provided while students make choices. We consider two variations of IDAM: one in which they are only informed about whether they are tentatively accepted or not (IDAM-NC) and one in which students are additionally informed at each step of the tentative cutoff values for acceptance at each school (IDAM). A significantly higher proportion of stable outcomes is reached both under IDAM and IDAM-NC than under DA. The difference can be explained by a higher proportion of subjects following an equilibrium strategy akin to truthful behavior under IDAM and IDAM-NC than truthful behavior itself under DA. Moreover, the provision of inter
- Standort
-
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- Umfang
-
Online-Ressource, 38 S.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Anmerkungen
-
Veröffentlichungsversion
begutachtet
- Erschienen in
-
Discussion Papers / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Forschungsschwerpunkt Markt und Entscheidung, Abteilung Verhalten auf Märkten ; Bd. SP II 2016-209
- Klassifikation
-
Erziehung, Schul- und Bildungswesen
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wo)
-
Mannheim
- (wer)
-
SSOAR, GESIS – Leibniz-Institut für Sozialwissenschaften e.V.
- (wann)
-
2016
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wo)
-
Berlin
- (wer)
-
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung gGmbH
- (wann)
-
2016
- Urheber
- Beteiligte Personen und Organisationen
-
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung gGmbH
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:101:1-2022020211211469774917
- Rechteinformation
-
Open Access; Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
15.08.2025, 07:29 MESZ
Datenpartner
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Beteiligte
- Bó, Inácio Guerberoff Lanari
- Hakimov, Rustamdjan
- Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung gGmbH
- SSOAR, GESIS – Leibniz-Institut für Sozialwissenschaften e.V.
Entstanden
- 2016
Ähnliche Objekte (12)
Iterative versus standard deferred acceptance: Experimental evidence
The iterative deferred acceptance mechanism
The iterative deferred acceptance mechanism
An iterative deferred acceptance mechanism for decentralized, fast and fair childcare assignment
An iterative deferred acceptance mechanism for decentralized, fast and fair childcare assignment
Minimally unstable Pareto improvements over deferred acceptance
Stability of equilibrium outcomes under deferred acceptance: Acyclicity and dropping strategies
"Hope deferred."
On the (im)possibility of improving upon the student-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism
On the (im)possibility of improving upon the student-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism
Deferred Patent Examination
Regulating deferred incentive pay
Iterative versus standard deferred acceptance: Experimental evidence
The iterative deferred acceptance mechanism
The iterative deferred acceptance mechanism
An iterative deferred acceptance mechanism for decentralized, fast and fair childcare assignment
An iterative deferred acceptance mechanism for decentralized, fast and fair childcare assignment
Minimally unstable Pareto improvements over deferred acceptance
Stability of equilibrium outcomes under deferred acceptance: Acyclicity and dropping strategies
"Hope deferred."
On the (im)possibility of improving upon the student-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism
On the (im)possibility of improving upon the student-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism
Deferred Patent Examination
Regulating deferred incentive pay
Iterative versus standard deferred acceptance: Experimental evidence
The iterative deferred acceptance mechanism
The iterative deferred acceptance mechanism
An iterative deferred acceptance mechanism for decentralized, fast and fair childcare assignment
An iterative deferred acceptance mechanism for decentralized, fast and fair childcare assignment
Minimally unstable Pareto improvements over deferred acceptance
Stability of equilibrium outcomes under deferred acceptance: Acyclicity and dropping strategies
"Hope deferred."
On the (im)possibility of improving upon the student-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism
On the (im)possibility of improving upon the student-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism
Deferred Patent Examination