The iterative deferred acceptance mechanism
Abstract: We introduce a new mechanism for matching students to schools or universities, denoted Iterative Deferred Acceptance Mechanism (IDAM), inspired by procedures currently being used to match millions of students to public universities in Brazil and China. Unlike most options available in the literature, IDAM is not a direct mechanism. Instead of requesting from each student a full preference over all colleges, the student is instead repeatedly asked to choose one college among those which would accept her given the current set of students choosing that college. Although the induced sequential game has no dominant strategy, when students simply choose the most preferred college in each period (denoted the straightforward strategy), the matching that is produced is the Student Optimal Stable Matching. Moreover, under imperfect information, students following the straightforward strategy is an Ordinal Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium. Based on data from 2016, we also provide evidence that, d
- Location
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Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- Extent
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Online-Ressource, 28 S.
- Language
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Englisch
- Notes
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Veröffentlichungsversion
begutachtet (peer reviewed)
- Bibliographic citation
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Discussion Papers / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Forschungsschwerpunkt Markt und Entscheidung, Abteilung Verhalten auf Märkten ; Bd. SP II 2016-212
- Classification
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Erziehung, Schul- und Bildungswesen
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (where)
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Mannheim
- (who)
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SSOAR, GESIS – Leibniz-Institut für Sozialwissenschaften e.V.
- (when)
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2016
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (where)
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Berlin
- (who)
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Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung gGmbH
- (when)
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2016
- Creator
- Contributor
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Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung gGmbH
- URN
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urn:nbn:de:101:1-2022020211214049104466
- Rights
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Open Access; Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Last update
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15.08.2025, 7:33 AM CEST
Data provider
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Associated
- Bó, Inácio Guerberoff Lanari
- Hakimov, Rustamdjan
- Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung gGmbH
- SSOAR, GESIS – Leibniz-Institut für Sozialwissenschaften e.V.
Time of origin
- 2016
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On the (im)possibility of improving upon the student-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism
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Minimally unstable Pareto improvements over deferred acceptance
Stability of equilibrium outcomes under deferred acceptance: Acyclicity and dropping strategies
"Hope deferred."
Deferred Patent Examination
Regulating deferred incentive pay
The iterative deferred acceptance mechanism
Iterative versus standard deferred acceptance: Experimental evidence
Iterative versus standard deferred acceptance: experimental evidence
An iterative deferred acceptance mechanism for decentralized, fast and fair childcare assignment
An iterative deferred acceptance mechanism for decentralized, fast and fair childcare assignment
On the (im)possibility of improving upon the student-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism
On the (im)possibility of improving upon the student-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism
Minimally unstable Pareto improvements over deferred acceptance
Stability of equilibrium outcomes under deferred acceptance: Acyclicity and dropping strategies
"Hope deferred."
Deferred Patent Examination