Arbeitspapier
Overconfidence in the Markets for Lemons
We extend Akerlof (1970)'s 'Market for Lemons' by assuming that some buyers are overconfident. Buyers in our model receive a noisy signal about the quality of the good that is on display for sale. Overconfident buyers do not update according to Bayes' rule but take the noisy signal at face value. We show that the presence of overconfident buyers can stabilize the market outcome by preventing total adverse selection. This stabilization, however, comes at a cost: rational buyers are crowded out of the market.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper ; No. 452
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Information and Product Quality; Standardization and Compatibility
- Subject
-
Adverse Selection
Market for Lemons
Overconfidence
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Herweg, Fabian
Müller, Daniel
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
- (where)
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München
- (when)
-
2013
- DOI
-
doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.17652
- Handle
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-17652-1
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Herweg, Fabian
- Müller, Daniel
- Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
Time of origin
- 2013