Arbeitspapier

Overconfidence in the Markets for Lemons

We extend Akerlof (1970)'s 'Market for Lemons' by assuming that some buyers are overconfident. Buyers in our model receive a noisy signal about the quality of the good that is on display for sale. Overconfident buyers do not update according to Bayes' rule but take the noisy signal at face value. We show that the presence of overconfident buyers can stabilize the market outcome by preventing total adverse selection. This stabilization, however, comes at a cost: rational buyers are crowded out of the market.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper ; No. 452

Classification
Wirtschaft
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Information and Product Quality; Standardization and Compatibility
Subject
Adverse Selection
Market for Lemons
Overconfidence

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Herweg, Fabian
Müller, Daniel
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
(where)
München
(when)
2013

DOI
doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.17652
Handle
URN
urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-17652-1
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Herweg, Fabian
  • Müller, Daniel
  • Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)

Time of origin

  • 2013

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