Price Discrimination in Input Markets: Quantity Discounts and Private Information

Arbeitspapier

We consider a monopolistic supplier’s optimal choice of wholesale tariffs when downstream firms are privately informed about their retail costs. Under discriminatory pricing, downstream firms that differ in their ex ante distribution of retail costs are offered different tariffs. Under uniform pricing, the same wholesale tariff is offered to all downstream firms. In contrast to the extant literature on price discrimination with nonlinear wholesale tariffs, we find that banning discriminatory wholesale contracts often improves welfare. This also holds if the manufacturer is not an unconstrained monopolist. Moreover, uniform pricing increases downstream investments in cost reduction in the long run.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 4202

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms ; Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts
• Subject: asymmetric information ; input markets ; quantity discounts ; price discrimination ; screening ; vertical contracting

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Herweg, Fabian ; Müller, Daniel
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (where): Munich
• (when): 2013

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/72559
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET