Hochschulschrift
Temporal dilemma, time preferences and natural resource extraction
- Standort
-
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- Umfang
-
Online-Ressource
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Anmerkungen
-
Bremen, Jacobs Univ., Dissertation, 2016
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wo)
-
Bremen
- (wer)
-
IRC-Library, Information Resource Center der Jacobs University Bremen
- (wann)
-
2017
- Urheber
-
Javaid, Aneeque
- Beteiligte Personen und Organisationen
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:gbv:579-opus-1007012
- Rechteinformation
-
Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
25.03.2025, 13:50 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
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Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Hochschulschrift
Beteiligte
- Javaid, Aneeque
- Schlüter, Achim
- Reuter, Hauke
- Hütt, Marc-Thorsten
- IRC-Library, Information Resource Center der Jacobs University Bremen
Entstanden
- 2017
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