Lobbying over Exhaustible-Resource Extraction

Konferenzbeitrag

Consider a lobby group of exhaustible-resource suppliers, which bargains with the government over the extraction of an exhaustible resource and over contribution payments. We characterize the path of contributions and the resulting extraction path, taking into account how the environmental damage of resource usage and the demand elasticity change optimal extraction. A high marginal environmental flow damage reduces the government s preferred speed of extraction, a low price elasticity of resource demand reduces that of the lobby. Moreover, the lobby s preferred total extraction exceeds that of the government whenever environmental stock damages exist. Contribution payments are usually positive and declining, along with the conflict of interest between the government and the lobby. In some cases, they may be increasing for while, possibly from a negative level, but they eventually decline and vanish in the long run.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2015: Ökonomische Entwicklung - Theorie und Politik - Session: Lobbying ; No. B12-V3

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior ; Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation: Government Policy ; Environmental Economics: Government Policy

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Schopf, Mark ; Voß, Achim
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (when): 2015

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/112814
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET