Cooperation in a resource extraction game

Arbeitspapier

An exhaustible stock of resources may be exploited by N players. An arbitrarily long duration of the game is only possible, if the utility function satisfies certain restrictions at small values R of extraction. We find that stability against unilateral defection occurs if the elasticity of the marginal utility turns out to be larger than (N - 1 )/N, however independent of the value of the discount factor. Hence we find that cooperation does not depend on the discount factor for a certain range of elasticities. Analogy to phase transitions in statistical physics is discussed.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Kiel Working Paper ; No. 846

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Noncooperative Games ; Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games ; Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation: General

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Stähler, Frank ; Wagner, Friedrich
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Kiel Institute of World Economics (IfW) ; ZBW – Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
• (wo): Kiel
• (wann): 1998

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/52660
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ