Cooperation in a resource extraction game

Arbeitspapier

An exhaustible stock of resources may be exploited by N players. An arbitrarily long duration of the game is only possible, if the utility function satisfies certain restrictions at small values R of extraction. We find that stability against unilateral defection occurs if the elasticity of the marginal utility turns out to be larger than (N - 1 )/N, however independent of the value of the discount factor. Hence we find that cooperation does not depend on the discount factor for a certain range of elasticities. Analogy to phase transitions in statistical physics is discussed.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Kiel Working Paper ; No. 846

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Noncooperative Games ; Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games ; Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation: General

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Stähler, Frank ; Wagner, Friedrich
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Kiel Institute of World Economics (IfW) ; ZBW – Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
• (where): Kiel
• (when): 1998

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/52660
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET