Arbeitspapier

Common pool resources: Is there support for conservationists?

We examine the role of support for coalition stability in common pool resource games such as fisheries games. Some players may not want to join a coalition that jointly manages a resource. Still, because they benefit from spillovers, they may want to support the coalition with a transfer payment in order to set incentives for others to join. We find that the impact of support on equilibria of this game is limited to games with three or five players.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. TI 2018-083/VIII

Classification
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
Renewable Resources and Conservation: General
Subject
Cartel games
Coalition formation
Common Pool Resources
Support

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Ansink, Erik
Weikard, Hans-Peter
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Tinbergen Institute
(where)
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
(when)
2018

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Ansink, Erik
  • Weikard, Hans-Peter
  • Tinbergen Institute

Time of origin

  • 2018

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