Arbeitspapier
Common pool resources: Is there support for conservationists?
We examine the role of support for coalition stability in common pool resource games such as fisheries games. Some players may not want to join a coalition that jointly manages a resource. Still, because they benefit from spillovers, they may want to support the coalition with a transfer payment in order to set incentives for others to join. We find that the impact of support on equilibria of this game is limited to games with three or five players.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. TI 2018-083/VIII
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
Renewable Resources and Conservation: General
- Subject
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Cartel games
Coalition formation
Common Pool Resources
Support
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Ansink, Erik
Weikard, Hans-Peter
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Tinbergen Institute
- (where)
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Amsterdam and Rotterdam
- (when)
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2018
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
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Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Ansink, Erik
- Weikard, Hans-Peter
- Tinbergen Institute
Time of origin
- 2018