Arbeitspapier

Co-managing common pool resources: Do formal rules have to be adapted to traditional ecological norms

We examine the effectiveness of three democratically chosen rules that alleviate the coordination and cooperation problems inherent in collectively managed common-pool resources. In particular we investigate how rule effectiveness and rule compliance depends on the prevailing local norms and ecological values held by resource users. For this purpose, we employ a framed field experiment that is based on a rangeland model for semi-arid regions and carried out with communal farmers in Namibia and South Africa. Participants could vote for three 'best practice' management rules found in many places around the world that are discussed for implementation in the study area: (temporary) private property rights, rotational grazing or limitation of livestock numbers. All rules were designed in a way that facilitated cooperation or coordination of actions. The focus of this study lies on the interactions between these rules and prevalent ecological norms exhibited in the rounds prior to rule implementation. In contrast to previous lab experimental studies, we find that democratic voting of rules is not sufficient for high rule compliance and an overall enhancement in cooperation. Rules turned out to be inefficient if they were in conflict with the prevalent ecological norm.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Working Papers in Economics and Statistics ; No. 2013-15

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Cooperative Games
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Renewable Resources and Conservation: Land
Thema
field laboratory experiment
rule compliance
ecological norms
common-pool resource
adaptive co-management
Southern Africa
Gemeingüter
Natürliche Ressourcen
Kooperation
Social Capital
Vertrauen
Spieltheorie
Feldforschung
Theorie
Südafrika

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Vollan, Björn
Prediger, Sebastian
Frölich, Markus
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
University of Innsbruck, Research Platform Empirical and Experimental Economics (eeecon)
(wo)
Innsbruck
(wann)
2013

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Vollan, Björn
  • Prediger, Sebastian
  • Frölich, Markus
  • University of Innsbruck, Research Platform Empirical and Experimental Economics (eeecon)

Entstanden

  • 2013

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