Should utility-reducing media advertising be taxed?

Arbeitspapier

Empirical evidence suggests that people dislike ads in media products like TV programs. In such situations standard economic theory prescribes that the advertising volume can be optimally reduced by levying a tax on ads. However, making use of recent advances in the theory of Industrial Organization and two-sided markets we show that taxing ads may be counterproductive. In particular, we identify a number of situations in which ad-adverse consumers are negatively affected by the tax, and we even show that the tax may lead to higher ad volumes. This unorthodox reaction to a tax may arise when consumers significantly dislike ads, i.e. in situations where traditional arguments for corrective taxes are strongest.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 2589

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; Taxation and Subsidies: Efficiency; Optimal Taxation ; Taxation and Subsidies: Incidence ; Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
• Thema: Two-sided markets ; media market ; pricing strategy ; ad-tax ; Rundfunkwerbung ; Werbebeschränkung ; Steuer ; Steuerwirkung ; Medienökonomik ; Lieferanten-Kunden-Beziehung ; Medienverhalten ; Betriebliche Preispolitik ; Werbewirtschaft ; Theorie

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Kind, Hans Jarle ; Köthenbürger, Marko ; Schjelderup, Guttorm
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (wo): Munich
• (wann): 2009

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26634
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ