On the evolution of preferences

Arbeitspapier

A common feature of the literature on the evolution of preferences is that evolution favors nonmaterialistic preferences only if preference types are observable at least to some degree. We argue that this result is due to the assumption that in each state of the evolutionary dynamics some Bayesian Nash equilibrium is played. We show that under unobservability of preference types, conditional on selecting some self-confirming equilibrium as a rule for mapping preference into behavior, non-selfish preferences may be evolutionarily successful.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Jena Economic Research Papers ; No. 2011,032

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Relation of Economics to Social Values ; Noncooperative Games ; Altruism; Philanthropy; Intergenerational Transfers ; Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
• Subject: evolution of preferences ; altruism ; learning ; self-confirming equilibrium ; Präferenztheorie ; Evolutionsökonomik ; Altruismus ; Nichtkooperatives Spiel ; Lernprozess ; Theorie

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Gamba, Astrid
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics
• (where): Jena
• (when): 2011

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/56851
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET