Arbeitspapier
On the evolution of preferences
A common feature of the literature on the evolution of preferences is that evolution favors nonmaterialistic preferences only if preference types are observable at least to some degree. We argue that this result is due to the assumption that in each state of the evolutionary dynamics some Bayesian Nash equilibrium is played. We show that under unobservability of preference types, conditional on selecting some self-confirming equilibrium as a rule for mapping preference into behavior, non-selfish preferences may be evolutionarily successful.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Jena Economic Research Papers ; No. 2011,032
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Relation of Economics to Social Values
Noncooperative Games
Altruism; Philanthropy; Intergenerational Transfers
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
- Thema
-
evolution of preferences
altruism
learning
self-confirming equilibrium
Präferenztheorie
Evolutionsökonomik
Altruismus
Nichtkooperatives Spiel
Lernprozess
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Gamba, Astrid
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics
- (wo)
-
Jena
- (wann)
-
2011
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Gamba, Astrid
- Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics
Entstanden
- 2011
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