Arbeitspapier
Do re-election probabilities influence public investment?
We identify exogenous variation in incumbent policymakers' re-election probabilities and explore empirically how this variation affects the incumbents' investment in physical capital. Our results indicate that a higher re-election probability leads to higher investments, particularly in the purposes preferred more strongly by the incumbents. This aligns with a theoretical framework where political parties disagree about which public goods to produce using labor and predetermined public capital. Key for the consistency between data and theory is to account for complementarity between physical capital and flow variables in government production.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 2709
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Fiscal Policy
Publicly Provided Goods: General
State and Local Budget and Expenditures
- Thema
-
political economics
strategic capital accumulation
identifying popularity shocks
Infrastrukturinvestition
Öffentliche Investition
Wiederwahl
Public Choice
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Fiva, Jon H.
Natvik, Gisle James
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2009
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:46 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Fiva, Jon H.
- Natvik, Gisle James
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2009