Arbeitspapier
Public investment and re-election prospects in developed countries
A growing literature suggests that office motivated politicians manipulate fiscal policy instruments in order to seek their re-election. This paper investigates the impact of electoral manipulation of the level and composition of fiscal policy on incumbent's re-election prospects. This impact is estimated for a panel of 21 OECD countries over the period 1972- 1999. Our results suggest that increased public investment during the term in office, as well as a shift in expenditures towards public investment can improve re-election prospects. On the contrary, election year manipulation via public investment does not affect re-election prospects. We also find that voters punish politicians who create deficits during elections, while deficits that proceed the election year have similar, although smaller effects on the reelection prospects.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 3570
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Fiscal Policy
- Thema
-
political budget cycles
elections
quality of public expenditure
public investment
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Katsimi, Margarita
Sarantides, Vassilis
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2011
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Katsimi, Margarita
- Sarantides, Vassilis
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2011