Effects of Conferring Business Resource on Rivals

Konferenzbeitrag

We examine how requiring platforms to give rivals resources, such as data, affects innovation. Using simulations in which an initial firm obtains a head start on rivals and uses that head start to build a valuable resource that subsequently gives it a competitive advantage over rivals when competing in the initial technology, we contrast scenarios in which the initial firm is or is not required by a government regulator to provide this resource to rivals. We develop pricing provisions that incentivize the initial firm to voluntarily provide the resource to rivals. We then contrast incentives to create substitutes for the initial technology.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: 31st European Conference of the International Telecommunications Society (ITS): "Reining in Digital Platforms? Challenging monopolies, promoting competition and developing regulatory regimes", Gothenburg, Sweden, 20th - 21st June 2022

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets ; Information and Product Quality; Standardization and Compatibility ; Economics of Regulation
• Subject: platforms ; innovation ; competition

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Ajit, Tejaswi Channagiri ; Jamison, Mark A.
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): International Telecommunications Society (ITS)
• (where): Calgary
• (when): 2022

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/265609
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET