Limiting rival's efficiency via conditional discounts

Konferenzbeitrag

This paper studies the impact of a dominant firm's conditional discounts on competitors' learning-by-doing. In a vertical context where a dominant upstream supplier and a competitive fringe sell their products to a single downstream firm, we analyze whether the dominant supplier prefers to off er a discount scheme, as in particular a quantity or market-share discount. In a dynamic setting with complete information and learning-by-doing, short-term market-share discounts and long-run contracts are more pro fitable to the dominant supplier than simple two-part tariff s or quantity discounts. We show that two-part tariff s as well as quantity discounts lead to more learning than market-share discounts, or long-term contracts. Thus, the dominant fi rm's contract choice restricts the competitive fringe's e fficiency gain. Similar results occur for network eff ects.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2013: Wettbewerbspolitik und Regulierung in einer globalen Wirtschaftsordnung - Session: Vertical Restraints and Retail ; No. E13-V3

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts ; Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets ; Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Greer, Katja
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
• (wo): Kiel und Hamburg
• (wann): 2013

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/79730
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ