Arbeitspapier

Regret in Dynamic Decision Problems

The paper proposes a framework to extend regret theory to dynamic contexts. The key idea is to conceive of a dynamic decision problem with regret as an intra-personal game in which the agent forms conjectures about the behaviour of the various counterfactual selves that he could have been. We derive behavioural implications in situations in which payoffs are correlated across either time or contingencies. In the first case, regret might lead to excess conservatism or a tendency to make up for missed opportunities. In the second case, behaviour is shaped by the agent's self-conception. We relate our results to empirical evidence.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper ; No. 71

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Krähmer, Daniel
Stone, Rebecca
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
(wo)
München
(wann)
2005

DOI
doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.13479
Handle
URN
urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-13479-3
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Krähmer, Daniel
  • Stone, Rebecca
  • Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)

Entstanden

  • 2005

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