INFORMATION, AUTHORITY, AND SMOOTH COMMUNICATION IN ORGANIZATIONS

Konferenzbeitrag

Two divisions of a firm, overarched by a headquarters, are engaged in a decision problem. Division one obtains information and informs division two who has the formal authority to make the decision. Headquarters guides the decision process by affecting the quality of information that division one obtains. In equilibrium, division one honestly communicates the inferences drawn from its observations, but not the underlying observations themselves and division two takes the advice at face value. The communication equilibrium involves smooth strategies and is outcome equivalent to delegation: the informed party gets its way, regardless of the allocation of formal authority.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2016: Demographischer Wandel - Session: Organizational Economics: Authority in Organizations ; No. B23-V2

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design ; Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness ; Economics of Contract: Theory

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Szalay, Dezsö ; Deimen, Inga
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
• (where): Kiel und Hamburg
• (when): 2016

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/145668
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET