Delegating climate policy to a supranational authority: a theoretical assessment

Konferenzbeitrag

We study the delegation of climate policy to a supranational environmental authority. We demonstrate that the authority faces a dynamic inconsistency problem that leads to welfare losses. The losses can be kept small if the mandate of the authority penalizes the local cost of emissions heavily, but puts little or no weight on the cost of climate change. The design of the authority's mandate creates another dynamic inconsistency because the countries face a recurrent incentive to modify it.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2017: Alternative Geld- und Finanzarchitekturen - Session: Environmental Economics, Natural Resources and Climate Change I ; No. A17-V3

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; International Agreements and Observance; International Organizations ; International Fiscal Issues; International Public Goods ; Technological Change: Choices and Consequences; Diffusion Processes ; Energy and the Macroeconomy ; Climate; Natural Disasters and Their Management; Global Warming

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Pichler, Paul ; Sorger, Gerhard
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
• (where): Kiel, Hamburg
• (when): 2017

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/168058
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET