EU merger control in differentiated product industries

Arbeitspapier

EU Merger Control Regulation No 4064/89 tended to rely on a dominance test, based on the market share of undertakings, to indicate the level and potential changes in market power. The use of such in differentiated product industries is questionable. New EC Merger Regulation No 139/2004 introduces a substantive test to ensure that all post-merger scenarios posing a threat to competition, even amongst small undertakings, are detected. We propose the use of a simple structural approach to undertake a substantive test. We illustrate our point over 28 periods, 178 products (13 companies), for Retail Carbonated Soft Drinks. We estimate company (product) mark-ups using a 'simple? Nested Logit model, Berry (1994) and a more 'sophisticated? model, Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995). While the dominance test may fail to identify damaging mergers in differentiated products industries, this technique will not.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 1312

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Antitrust Issues and Policies: General ; Retail and Wholesale Trade; e-Commerce ; Firm Performance: Size, Diversification, and Scope ; Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
• Thema: market shares ; market power ; differentiated products industries ; mergers ; Fusionskontrolle ; Produktdifferenzierung ; Marktmacht ; Relevanter Markt ; EU-Staaten

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Mariuzzo, Franco ; Walsh, Patrick Paul ; Whelan, Ciara
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (wo): Munich
• (wann): 2004

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18677
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ