Do anti-dumping rules facilitate the abuse of market dominance?

Arbeitspapier

We discuss the effects of AD-protection in a standard Dixit model of entry deterrence. In an AD-regime, the newcomer is constrained by a minimum-price rule in addition to existing irreversible entrance costs. For minimum prices which lie below the Stackelberg one, we find that AD-rules distort competition. We show that AD-protection increases the advantages of entry deterrence for a wide range of combinations of sunk costs and minimum prices. When entrance costs are high, consumer welfare is lower in an AD- regime than under free trade. Consequently, AD-protection facilitates the abuse of market dominance.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: IWP Discussion Paper ; No. 2001/3

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Empirical Studies of Trade ; Antitrust Issues and Policies: General
• Subject: Anti-dumping ; abuse of market dominance ; strategic firm behaviour ; Antidumping ; Markteintritt ; Marktmacht ; Wettbewerbsbeschränkung ; Theorie

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Theuringer, Martin ; Weiss, Pia
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Universität zu Köln, Institut für Wirtschaftspolitik (iwp)
• (where): Köln
• (when): 2001

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/39250
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET