Konferenzbeitrag
Constrained Interactions and Social Coordination
We consider a co-evolutionary model of social coordination and network formation where agents may decide on an action in a 2x2 - coordination game and on whom to establish costly links to. We fi nd that a payo ff dominant convention is selected for a wider parameter range when agents may only support a limited number of links as compared to a scenario where agents are not constrained in their linking choice. The main reason behind this result is that under constrained interactions agents face a trade-off between the links they have and those they would rather have.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2013: Wettbewerbspolitik und Regulierung in einer globalen Wirtschaftsordnung - Session: Evolution of Networks and Games ; No. F22-V
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
Noncooperative Games
Network Formation and Analysis: Theory
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Staudigl, Mathias
Weidenholzer, Simon
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
- (wo)
-
Kiel und Hamburg
- (wann)
-
2013
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:46 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Konferenzbeitrag
Beteiligte
- Staudigl, Mathias
- Weidenholzer, Simon
- ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
Entstanden
- 2013
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