Constrained Interactions and Social Coordination

Konferenzbeitrag

We consider a co-evolutionary model of social coordination and network formation where agents may decide on an action in a 2x2 - coordination game and on whom to establish costly links to. We fi nd that a payo ff dominant convention is selected for a wider parameter range when agents may only support a limited number of links as compared to a scenario where agents are not constrained in their linking choice. The main reason behind this result is that under constrained interactions agents face a trade-off between the links they have and those they would rather have.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2013: Wettbewerbspolitik und Regulierung in einer globalen Wirtschaftsordnung - Session: Evolution of Networks and Games ; No. F22-V

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games ; Noncooperative Games ; Network Formation and Analysis: Theory

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Staudigl, Mathias ; Weidenholzer, Simon
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
• (where): Kiel und Hamburg
• (when): 2013

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/79822
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:46 AM CET