Arbeitspapier
Fiscal Equalization, Tax Salience, and Tax Competition
Jurisdictions that engage in inter-regional tax competition usually try to attenuate competitive pressures by substituting salient tax instruments with hidden ones. On this effect, we investigate the efficiency consequences of inter-regional tax competition and fiscal equalization in a federal system when taxpayers fail to optimally react on shrouded attributes of local tax policy. If the statuary tax rate is a relatively salient instrument and taxpayers pay low attention to the quality and the frequency of tax enforcement, the underlying substitution of tax instruments with the aim of reducing the perceived tax price may suppress the under-exploitation of tax bases that is typically triggered by fiscal equalization.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: IWH Discussion Papers ; No. 3/2014
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism; Secession
Taxation and Subsidies: Incidence
Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents: General
- Thema
-
fiscal equalization
tax salience
tax competition
fiscal federalism
tax-cutcum-base-broadening policy
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Altemeyer-Bartscher, Martin
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle (IWH)
- (wo)
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Halle (Saale)
- (wann)
-
2014
- Handle
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:gbv:3:2-28829
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
03.03.2025, 08:25 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Altemeyer-Bartscher, Martin
- Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle (IWH)
Entstanden
- 2014