Arbeitspapier

Fiscal Equalization, Tax Salience, and Tax Competition

Jurisdictions that engage in inter-regional tax competition usually try to attenuate competitive pressures by substituting salient tax instruments with hidden ones. On this effect, we investigate the efficiency consequences of inter-regional tax competition and fiscal equalization in a federal system when taxpayers fail to optimally react on shrouded attributes of local tax policy. If the statuary tax rate is a relatively salient instrument and taxpayers pay low attention to the quality and the frequency of tax enforcement, the underlying substitution of tax instruments with the aim of reducing the perceived tax price may suppress the under-exploitation of tax bases that is typically triggered by fiscal equalization.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: IWH Discussion Papers ; No. 3/2014

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism; Secession
Taxation and Subsidies: Incidence
Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents: General
Thema
fiscal equalization
tax salience
tax competition
fiscal federalism
tax-cutcum-base-broadening policy

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Altemeyer-Bartscher, Martin
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle (IWH)
(wo)
Halle (Saale)
(wann)
2014

Handle
URN
urn:nbn:de:gbv:3:2-28829
Letzte Aktualisierung
03.03.2025, 08:25 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Altemeyer-Bartscher, Martin
  • Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle (IWH)

Entstanden

  • 2014

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