Arbeitspapier
Legislative bargaining with private information: A comparison of majority and unanimity rule / David Piazolo, Christoph Vanberg
We present a three-person, two-period bargaining game with private information. A single proposer is seeking to secure agreement to a proposal under either majority or unanimity rule. Two responders have privately known "breakdown values" which determine their payoff in case of "breakdown". Breakdown occurs with some probability if the first proposal fails and with certainty if the second proposal fails. We characterize Bayesian Equilibria in Sequentially Weakly Undominated Strategies. Our central result is that responders have a signaling incentive to vote "no" on the first proposal under unanimity rule, whereas no such incentive exists under majority rule. The reason is that being perceived as a "high breakdown value type" is advantageous under unanimity rule, but disadvantageous under majority rule. As a consequence, responders are "more expensive" under unanimity rule and disagreement is more likely. These results confirm intuitions that have been stated informally before and in addition yield deeper insights into the underlying incentives and what they imply for optimal behavior in bargaining with private information.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: AWI Discussion Paper Series ; No. 708
- Classification
-
Politik
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Piazolo, David
Vanberg, Christoph
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics
- (where)
-
Heidelberg
- (when)
-
2021
- DOI
-
doi:10.11588/heidok.00031117
- Handle
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:bsz:16-heidok-311177
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Piazolo, David
- Vanberg, Christoph
- University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics
Time of origin
- 2021
Other Objects (12)
Legislative bargaining with private information: A comparison of majority and unanimity rule
Legislative bargaining with private information: A comparison of majority and unanimity rule
Open rule legislative bargaining
Group size and decision rules in legislative bargaining
Group size and decision rules in legislative bargaining
Majority judgment vs. majority rule
Dynamic legislative bargaining
Flexible Majority Rules
Debt-Sensitive Majority Rules
Optimal majority rule in referenda
Stable demands and bargaining power in majority games
Resource allocation by frugal majority rule
Legislative bargaining with private information: A comparison of majority and unanimity rule
Legislative bargaining with private information: A comparison of majority and unanimity rule
Open rule legislative bargaining
Group size and decision rules in legislative bargaining
Group size and decision rules in legislative bargaining
Majority judgment vs. majority rule
Dynamic legislative bargaining
Flexible Majority Rules
Debt-Sensitive Majority Rules
Optimal majority rule in referenda
Stable demands and bargaining power in majority games
Resource allocation by frugal majority rule
Legislative bargaining with private information: A comparison of majority and unanimity rule
Legislative bargaining with private information: A comparison of majority and unanimity rule
Open rule legislative bargaining
Group size and decision rules in legislative bargaining
Group size and decision rules in legislative bargaining
Majority judgment vs. majority rule
Dynamic legislative bargaining
Flexible Majority Rules
Debt-Sensitive Majority Rules
Optimal majority rule in referenda
Stable demands and bargaining power in majority games