Arbeitspapier
Search Frictions, Competing Mechanisms and Optimal Market Segmentation
In a market in which sellers compete for heterogeneous buyers by posting mechanisms, we analyze how the properties of the meeting technology affect the allocation of buyers to sellers. We show that a separate submarket for each type of buyer is the efficient outcome if and only if meetings are bilateral. In contrast, a single market with all agents is optimal if and only if the meeting technology satisfies a novel condition, which we call "joint concavity." Both outcomes can be decentralized by sellers posting auctions combined with a fee that is paid by (or to) all buyers with whom the seller meets. Finally, we compare joint concavity to two other properties of meeting technologies, invariance and non-rivalry, and explain the differences.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 16-036/VI
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Auctions
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
- Subject
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search frictions
matching function
meeting technology
competing mechanisms
heterogeneity
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Cai, Xiaoming
Gautier, Pieter
Wolthoff, Ronald
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Tinbergen Institute
- (where)
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Amsterdam and Rotterdam
- (when)
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2016
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
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Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Cai, Xiaoming
- Gautier, Pieter
- Wolthoff, Ronald
- Tinbergen Institute
Time of origin
- 2016