Artikel

The Gibbard random dictatorship theorem: A generalization and a new proof

This paper proves stronger versions of the Gibbard random dictatorship theorem using induction on the number of voters. It shows that when there are at least three voters, every random social choice function defined on a domain satisfying a Free Triple at the Top property and satisfying a weak form of strategy-proofness called Limited-Comparison Strategy-proofness and Unanimity, is a random dictatorship provided that there are at least three alternatives. The weaker notion of strategy-proofness requires truth-telling to maximize a voter's expected utility only for a limited class of von NeumannMorgenstern utility representations of the voter's true preference ordering. In the case of two voters, an even weaker condition on the domain and a weaker notion of strategy-proofness are sufficient for the random dictatorship result.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Journal: SERIEs - Journal of the Spanish Economic Association ; ISSN: 1869-4195 ; Volume: 2 ; Year: 2011 ; Issue: 4 ; Pages: 515-527 ; Heidelberg: Springer

Classification
Wirtschaft
Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Subject
Gibbard's random dictatorship theorem : free triple at the top
limited comparison strategy-proofness
Diktatur
Abstimmungsregel
Erwartungsnutzen
Theorie

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Sen, Arunava
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Springer
(where)
Heidelberg
(when)
2011

DOI
doi:10.1007/s13209-011-0041-z
Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Artikel

Associated

  • Sen, Arunava
  • Springer

Time of origin

  • 2011

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