Arbeitspapier
Stable and Sustainable Global Tax Coordination with Leviathan Governments
Itaya et al. (2014) study the conditions for sustainability and stability of capital tax coordination in a repeated game model with tax-revenue maximizing governments. One of their major results is that the grand tax coalition is never stable and sustainable. The purpose of this note is to prove that there are conditions under which the grand tax coalition is stable and sustainable in Itaya et al.'s model.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 4909
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism; Secession
- Thema
-
global tax coordination
repeated game
sustainability
stability
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Eichner, Thomas
Pethig, Rüdiger
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2014
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Eichner, Thomas
- Pethig, Rüdiger
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2014
Ähnliche Objekte (12)
Stable and sustainable global tax coordination with Leviathan governments
Unilateral mitigation of climate damage via purchase of fossil fuel deposits
Forging a global environmental agreement through trade sanctions on free riders?
Stable climate coalitions (Nash) and international trade
Stable climate coalitions (Nash) and international trade
The carbon-budget approach to climate stabilization: Costeffective subglobal versus global action
Efficient management of insecure fossil fuel imports through taxing (!) domestic green energy?
Incidence of unilateral consumption taxes on world carbon emissions
Corrective Taxation for Curbing Pollution and Promoting Green Product Design and Recycling
Petchey's (2015) Extension of Oates & Schwab's (1988) Efficiency Result Revisited
Self-enforcing capital tax coordination
Das Gebuehrenkonzept der DSD auf dem oekonomischen Pruefstand
Stable and sustainable global tax coordination with Leviathan governments
Unilateral mitigation of climate damage via purchase of fossil fuel deposits
Forging a global environmental agreement through trade sanctions on free riders?
Stable climate coalitions (Nash) and international trade
Stable climate coalitions (Nash) and international trade
The carbon-budget approach to climate stabilization: Costeffective subglobal versus global action
Efficient management of insecure fossil fuel imports through taxing (!) domestic green energy?
Incidence of unilateral consumption taxes on world carbon emissions
Corrective Taxation for Curbing Pollution and Promoting Green Product Design and Recycling
Petchey's (2015) Extension of Oates & Schwab's (1988) Efficiency Result Revisited
Self-enforcing capital tax coordination
Das Gebuehrenkonzept der DSD auf dem oekonomischen Pruefstand
Stable and sustainable global tax coordination with Leviathan governments
Unilateral mitigation of climate damage via purchase of fossil fuel deposits
Forging a global environmental agreement through trade sanctions on free riders?
Stable climate coalitions (Nash) and international trade
Stable climate coalitions (Nash) and international trade
The carbon-budget approach to climate stabilization: Costeffective subglobal versus global action
Efficient management of insecure fossil fuel imports through taxing (!) domestic green energy?
Incidence of unilateral consumption taxes on world carbon emissions
Corrective Taxation for Curbing Pollution and Promoting Green Product Design and Recycling
Petchey's (2015) Extension of Oates & Schwab's (1988) Efficiency Result Revisited
Self-enforcing capital tax coordination