Does a "Ceo Chairman" guarantee better performance from a firm?

Artikel

This paper provides a brief review of the state of knowledge in the field of agency theory. The managerial power approach assumes that a chief executive officer is able to affect the scale of his or her pay. However, Kaplan (2012) and others see a different picture of the corporate-governance landscape, hence they provide certain market-based explanations for high compensation. Our paper examines the relationship between a firm's performance and the amount of managerial compensation, and the ability of a CEO to affect a board's decision regarding his or her total compensation. The dataset consists of 75 companies traded in the capital market in the US. Our panel dataset covers a 10-year period from 2004 to 2013. We developed a single equation panel data model. The resulting parameter values provide a different picture of CEO power and the interconnection between a firm's performance and CEO pay in both sectors

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Journal: DANUBE: Law, Economics and Social Issues Review ; ISSN: 1804-8285 ; Volume: 7 ; Year: 2016 ; Issue: 3 ; Pages: 145-160 ; Warsaw: De Gruyter

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft
• Thema: Agency Problem ; Incentive Plan ; Board of Directors ; CEO Compensation ; Realized Pay

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Srbek, Pavel ; Dittrich, Ludwig O.
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): De Gruyter
• (wo): Warsaw
• (wann): 2016

Weitere Informationen

• DOI: doi:10.1515/danb-2016-0009
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/184512
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ