A characterization of the Vickery rule in slot allocation problems

Arbeitspapier

We study the slot allocation problem where agents have quasi-linear single-peaked preferences over slots and identify the rules satisfying efficiency, strategy-proofness, and individual rationality. Since the quasi-linear single-peaked domain is not connected, the famous characterization of the Vickrey rule in terms of the three properties in Holmström (1979) cannot be applied. However, we are able to establish that on the quasi-linear single-peaked domain, the Vickrey rule is still the only rule satisfying efficiency, strategy-proofness, and individual rationality.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: ISER Discussion Paper ; No. 1120

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; Auctions ; Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
• Subject: Slot allocation problem ; single-peakedness ; efficiency ; strategy-proofness ; individual rationality ; Vickrey rule

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Zhou, Yu ; Chun, Youngsub ; Serizawa, Shigehiro
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)
• (where): Osaka
• (when): 2021

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/234932
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET