Arbeitspapier

A characterization of minimum price Walrasian rule in object allocation problem for an arbitrary number of objects

We consider the multi-object allocation problem with monetary transfers where each agent obtains at most one object (unit-demand). We focus on allocation rules satisfying individual rationality, no subsidy, efficiency, and strategy-proofness. Extending the result of Morimoto and Serizawa (2015), we show that for an arbitrary number of agents and objects, the minimum price Walrasian is characterized by the four properties on the classical domain.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: ISER Discussion Paper ; No. 1134

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Market Design
Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
Thema
Multi-object allocation problem
Strategy-proofness
Efficiency
Minimumprice Walrasian rule
Non-quasi-linear preference
Heterogeneous objects

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Sakai, Ryosuke
Serizawa, Shigehiro
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)
(wo)
Osaka
(wann)
2021

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Sakai, Ryosuke
  • Serizawa, Shigehiro
  • Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)

Entstanden

  • 2021

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