Arbeitspapier
A characterization of minimum price Walrasian rule in object allocation problem for an arbitrary number of objects
We consider the multi-object allocation problem with monetary transfers where each agent obtains at most one object (unit-demand). We focus on allocation rules satisfying individual rationality, no subsidy, efficiency, and strategy-proofness. Extending the result of Morimoto and Serizawa (2015), we show that for an arbitrary number of agents and objects, the minimum price Walrasian is characterized by the four properties on the classical domain.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: ISER Discussion Paper ; No. 1134
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Market Design
Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
- Thema
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Multi-object allocation problem
Strategy-proofness
Efficiency
Minimumprice Walrasian rule
Non-quasi-linear preference
Heterogeneous objects
- Ereignis
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
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Sakai, Ryosuke
Serizawa, Shigehiro
- Ereignis
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Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)
- (wo)
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Osaka
- (wann)
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2021
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Sakai, Ryosuke
- Serizawa, Shigehiro
- Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)
Entstanden
- 2021