A Note on Social Norms and Transfers

Arbeitspapier

This note elaborates an extension of the paper 'Social Norms, the Welfare State, and Voting' by Lindbeck, Nyberg, and Weibull [1]. That paper studies the effects of a social norm against living off others work. In the welfare-state context of their model, this means that individuals who live on public transfers experience disutility. One limitation in the model is that the individual's choice is binary: either to work full time or not at all. Here we allow individuals to choose working hours on a continuous scale. We derive a fixed-point equation that determines all individuals number of work hours, and show that the limitation to a binary choice is not binding if individuals have Cobb-Douglas preferences and no non-labor incomes.

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• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: IUI Working Paper ; No. 478

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Sociology of Economics
• Subject: Sociology ; Labour Market ; Soziale Werte ; Sozialstaat ; Theorie

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Sundén, David ; Weibull, Jörgen W.
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): The Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IUI)
• (where): Stockholm
• (when): 1997

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/95130